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기업 특성이 은행ㆍ기업관계에 미치는 영향

  • 이상욱 서울산업대학교 경영학과 교수
본 연구는 우리나라 기업과 거래은행 자료를 이용하여 기업 관점에서 은행?기업관계의 차이를 살펴보았다. 실증 분석에 따르면 기업의 정보비대칭성(외형적 특성 : 규모, 업력, 유형자산 비중)이 낮을수록 기업들은 보다 많은 은행들과 거래관계를 유지하는 반면 주거래은행의 대출비중이 낮은 것으로 나타났다. 기업 경영성과(ROA) 및 위험(금융비용 부담률) 측면에서도 경영성과가 양호하고 위험성이 낮은 기업일수록 보다 많은 은행들과 거래관 계를 유지하는 반면 주거래은행의 대출비중이 낮은 것으로 나타났다. 한편 기업 성장과 투자 측면에서는 성장 지향적이거나 투자가 많은 기업일수록 주거래 은행의 대출비중이 높은 것으로 나타났다. 기업재무 건전성 측면 에서는 재무건전성이 양호한 기업일수록 거래은행 수가 적은 반면 주거래은행의 대출 비중은 높은 것으로 나타 났다. 우리나라 은행?기업관계에서는 단기적으로 양호한 경영성과를 보이거나 위험성이 낮은 기업들의 경우 거래은 행 다변화가 용이한 것으로 보인다. 또한 성장 지향적이거나 투자수요가 많은 기업들은 거래은행 다변화가 용 이하지 않은 반면 기존 주거래은행 등과의 관계 강화를 중요시 하는 것으로 보인다. 한편 재무건전성이 양호한 기업은 소수의 은행과 거래하더라도 자금 조달이 용이한 것으로 추정된다.
은행ㆍ기업관계,정보비대칭성,거래은행 수,주거래은행

The Effect of Firm Characteristics on Firm-Bank Relationships

  • Sang Wook Lee
This paper analyzes the firm-bank relationship from a borrower (firm)’s perspective using the data of Korea’ s listed firms and banks in transaction relationships (say related banks). For the analysis, I use a number of related banks or the of dependence of a firm on the main bank as measurements of firm-bank relationship. Further, the more related bank means that the firm has many ties with banks, which implies the firm can make new relationship with new bank easily. However, each tie is weak in the strength. In the other hands, the more dependence on the main bank means that the firm has the deeper relationship with the main bank. The firm characteristics for the analysis are classified into four categories. The first includes the information asymmetries on the borrower. Firm size, firm history and proportion of tangible assets among total assets are used to capture the information asymmetries. In particular, the firm with bigger size or longer history might have lower information asymmetries in the loan market. The more tangible asset of a firm, often hold as a mortgage in the loan contract, also could decrease the information asymmetries in loan market. The second category includes the performance and the risk of the borrower. ROA and the interest expenses-sales ratio capture the performance and the risk of the firm respectively. The firm showing better performance or with lower risks has less trouble to make a new relationship with new banks. However, these variables does not indicate the depth of relationship between a firm and banks. The third includes the characteristics regarding the growth and investment of a firm. Growth rate in sales and average growth rate in sales for recent five years are used to capture the growth characteristic of a firm. Further, investment activity of a firm is measured by the increase in tangible asset divided by total asset of a firm. Since the firm with fast growth and intensive investment is more likely to have the higher information asymmetries in the loan market, the firm might have trouble to raise funds from banks except the main bank. Therefore, we expect that the growth and investment of a firm are loosely related to the depth of relationship with banks. The fourth is the financial soundness, which is important factor to determine the firm-bank relationship. The financially sounder firm can raise funds easily from only limited numbers of banks. Thus, the sounder financial status of a firm implies the deeper relationship with banks. Since the paper analyzes the firm-bank relationship in the firm’s perspective, I control the characteristics of banks for the analysis using variables like ROA and size of main bank. To control the effects of firm’s dependency on the bank loan, size of bank loans of a firm divided by total liabilities is used. Furthermore, year and industry dummies are included to control the effects of macro economic condition or industry characteristics. The result of empirical analysis shows that borrower with lower information asymmetries is easier to find new relationships with banks and has lower dependency on the main bank. Tuning to the performance and risk of a firm, the firm showing better performance or with lower risks is easier to find new relationship with banks and has lower dependency of the main banks. However, a firm with fast growth and intensive investment is more likely dependent on the main bank to raise funds. Also the result suggest that a firm with the sounder financial status has the smaller number of related banks and the higher dependence on the main bank. In summary, borrower with lower information asymmetries, better performance, and lower risks is more likely to have multiple ties with banks than growth-oriented (or investment-oriented) firms. However, the dependency on the main bank is stronger in growth-oriented (or investment-oriented) firms. In addition, the financial soundness make strengthen the relationship between the borrower and the main bank. It is a common belief that the alleviation of information asymmetry in the loan market can improve the intermediary role of banks. Also the strengthening of main bank stimulates the growth or investment of small-medium enterprise. Moreover, financial soundness of firms is crucial to strengthen the firm-bank relationship and enhance the intermediary role of banks. The analysis in this paper using Korean data empirically supports these common beliefs. However, this paper has several limitations to be improved in future researches. The empirical results are obtained from the recent Korean data, and the time-span of data is not sufficient. Therefore, more rigorous studies are required to generalize the result of this paper. Further, although simple test of correlation among variables shows that endogenous problem is negligible, still the endogenous problem could exist.
Firm-Bank Relationship,Information Asymmetry,Number Of Related Banks,Main Bank