LOG IN창 닫기

  • 회원님의 아이디와 패스워드를 입력해 주세요.
  • 회원이 아니시면 아래 [회원가입]을 눌러 회원가입을 해주시기 바랍니다.

아이디 저장

   

아이디 중복검사창 닫기

HONGGIDONG
사용 가능한 회원 아이디 입니다.

E-mail 중복확인창 닫기

honggildong@naver.com
사용 가능한 E-mail 주소 입니다.

우편번호 검색창 닫기

검색

SEARCH창 닫기

비밀번호 찾기

아이디

성명

E-mail

학술자료 검색

유상증자의 방식과 주간사 계약의 형태에 대한 연구

  • 김석봉 고려대학교 경영대학 박사
  • 박경서 고려대학교 경영대학 교수
  • 정찬식 동아대학교 경영학과 교수
본 연구는 대주주, 증권사 및 투자자간 정보 보유 정도가 각각 상이한 유상증자라는 경제적 사건을 중심으로 발행사 대주주의 보유지분율에 따른 경제적 유인이 유상증자의 방식 및 증권사와의 주간사 계약에 어떠한 영향을 미치며, 궁극적으로는 이들이 발행 가격 결정에 어떠한 영향을 미치는지 분석한다. 실증분석 결과 첫째, 대주주 지분율이 높을수록 발행사는 주주우선배정 방식보다는 주주배정 방식을 선호하고, 반대의 경우 주주우선배정 방식보다는 일반공모 방식을 선호하였다. 이는 대주주가 발행사에 대한 우월한 정보 보유를 바탕으로 발행사에 대한 관여를 통하여 이윤을 추구하며, 일반 투자자로의 부의 이전을 피하고자 하는 경제적 유인에 기인하는 것으로 해석된다. 둘째, 주주우선배정 방식하에서 발행사는 총액/잔액인수 계약을 체결하는 것으로 나타났다. 이는 실권주 인수 미달발생 위험에 따른 대주주의 잠재적인 경제적 손실을 최소화하기 위한 것으로 해석된다. 이때 상대적으로 명성이 낮은 증권사일수록 거래의 수임을 위하여 총액/잔액인수 계약을 체결하는데 적극적인 것으로 나타났다. 셋째, 주주우선 배정 방식 및 총액/잔액인수 계약의 경우, 상대적으로 저평가 정도가 높은 것으로 나타났다. 이는 유상증자의 확실한 성공을 원하는 대주주와 중개위험을 기피하고자 하는 증권사간 이해상충문제가 타협된 결과로 해석된다.
유상증자; 총액/잔액 인수; 모집주선; 정보비대칭; 대리인문제; SEO; Firm Commitment; Best Efforts; Information Asymmetry; Agency Problem

A Study on Secondary Equity Offering Floatation Methods and Forms of Underwriting Agreement

  • Sukbong Kim
  • Kyungsuh Park
  • Chan Shik Jung
This study analyses how the economic interests of a company’s largest shareholders affect the choice of secondary equity offering (“SEO”) floatation methods, forms of underwriting agreements with investment banks, and ultimately, the new share issuance price in a SEO where the information asymmetry is high amongst the largest shareholders, investment banks and investors. Unlike price discovery through bookbuilding process, issuing companies and investment banks determine issuance price prior to the offering in Korea. The SEO floatation methods and forms of underwriting agreement are publicly disclosed. This study differs itself from previous studies in that it evaluates how the economic interests of the largest shareholders as well as potential conflicts of interests amongst SEO participants may impact the selection of SEO floatation methods and forms of underwriting agreement. Furthermore, this study, by presenting the drivers behind a SEO and by analysing its effects, is anticipated to contribute to future research related to securities issuance, which is one of the most important financial decisions for corporations. The largest shareholders are seeking not only economic profits from SEO but also noneconomic objectives such as strengthened management control of the corporation. Investment banks tend to prioritize the relationship with the largest shareholders of the issuing company over the interests of retail investors. The forms of SEO can be classified into rights offering, rights offering with under subscribed shares to be offered to the public(“ROUP”), public offering, and 3rd party allotment. There are two types of underwriting agreements which include underwriting agreements on a firm commitment basis and best efforts basis. This study excludes cases where SEO is based on 3rd party allotment as well as those cases where underwriting agreements are non-existing. This study examines which floatation method of SEO is preferred according to the stakes of the largest shareholders and also identifies the financial variables which may have impact on the floatation method of SEO and forms of underwriting agreement chosen. Firstly, based on the analysis of precedent SEOs, we found that the higher the stake of the largest shareholders or the healthier the profitability and financial structure of a company, rights offerings is most preferred and public offering is least preferred. ROUP comes in between the rights offerings and public offerings. The main reason behind such outcome comes from the economic incentives of the largest shareholders. The largest shareholders take advantage of the situation where they possess superior information on the company relative to the retail investors. When the largest shareholders have higher stakes and therefore more economic interests, they tend to get more involved in the SEO process which could affect the economic benefit of minority investors and try to maintain or increase their existing stakes or trade preemptive rights to pursue economic interests. When the largest shareholders have lower stakes and therefore less economic rights, as long as the management control is secured, they tend not to commit more capital to maintaining their stakes not to share potential economic gains with outside investors because they’ve already disposed of significant stakes. Instead they’d rather seek another investment opportunity. In addition, outside investors would consider the largest shareholders’ trading of preemptive rights negative so that public offering is likely a choice of SEO floatation method in this case. Secondly, under ROUP, issuers prefer underwriting agreements on a firm commitment basis to minimize largest shareholders’ potential economic losses associated with under subscribed shares. The largest shareholders influence issuers to negotiate with investment banks to reflect their interests in the underwriting agreement. The less reputable investment banks aggressively take the risk of entering into an underwriting agreement on a firm commitment basis to get mandated for the SEO. The largest shareholders prefer underwriting agreement which guarantees that new shares be fully subscribed not to suffer from losses associated with under subscription which in turn has a negative effect on stock prices. On the other hand, in the case of public offerings where retail investors participate, the economic interests of the largest shareholders are less of importance and thus, issuers are indifferent to either form of underwriting agreement. Thirdly, under ROUP and underwriting agreements on a firm commitment basis, the level of discount and underpricing of issuance price is higher than that of the other SEO methods. This is the outcome of compromise of the conflicts of interests between the largest shareholders who want guarantee of the success of SEO and investment banks which want to minimize their underwriting risks. On the other hand, under underwriting agreements on a best efforts basis, because investment banks do not bear underwriting risks and only focus on the sale of new shares, they are not sensitive to the issuance price so there is no incentive for them to reduce the level of discount and the issuance price.