We show how interbank liquidity risk in China impacts the commodity futures risk premium across the world through commodity nancing deals. Investors import commodities, collateralize them, and invest high-yielding shadow banking products to exploit the high-interest rate dierences under capital controls and nancial frictions in China. We reveal that the Chinese commercial banks act as market makers of the shadow banking system in China, and they use the interbank market to resolve the associated maturity mismatch. If maturity mismatch risk intensies, the demand for commodities as collaterals would reduce. To sum up, we empirically show both predictive and contemporaneous relations when interbank liquidity risk in China increases, measured by the 3-month and the overnight interbank loan rates, the commodity futures risk premium decreases due to contractions in the hedging demands for commodity nancing deals. Our ndings are robust with regard to other channels not related to commodity nancing deals.