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The Asymmetric Effects of Cash Flows on Cash Holdings of Firms

  • Minshik Shin
  • Sooeun Kim
In this paper, we empirically analyze the asymmetric effects of cash flows on cash holdings of firms listed on Korea Exchange. Sample firms are classified into chaebol and non-chaebol firms, and also non-chaebol firms are classified into the financially unconstrained and constrained firms, on the basis of financial constraints. The financial constraints are judged by KZ index, capital market accessibility and credit rating scores according to the method of Faulkender and Smith (2007), and agency problems are judged by institutional holdings. The main results of this study can be summarized as follows. The effects of cash flows on cash holdings are lower for chaebol firms as compared to non-chaebol firms. Low sensitivity of cash holdings to cash flows for chaebol firms implies that there is an internal capital market(Shin and Park, 1999). The effects of cash flows on cash holdings for non-chaebol firms are asymmetric when facing positive or negative cash flow environment. The asymmetry my be due to several reasons, including binding project contracts, bad news withholding, and agency problems. The effects of cash flows on cash holdings are higher when a firm faces a negative cash flow environment, as compared to when a firm faces a positive cash flow environment. Moreover, The asymmetric effects of cash flows on cash holdings continue to hold in both financially constrained and unconstrained firms. Financially constrained firms, as compared to unconstrained firms, are less likely to invest in new projects or fund existing bad projects with negative NPV because they find it hard to obtain external financing. In addition, when institutional holdings are usable to control agency problems, firms with better outside monitoring by institutional investor dissave to capture good projects with positive NPV. In conclusion, because chaebol firms have internal capital market, the effect of cash flows on cash holdings are lower as compared to non-chaebol firms. However, the effects of cash flows on cash holdings are higher when a firm faces a negative cash flow environment, as compared to when a firm faces a positive cash flow environment. Although considering financial constraints and agency problems, firms have asymmetric responses to their cash holdings when facing positive or negative cash flow environment. This paper has a few limitations because it is an only early study about the asymmetric effects of cash flows on cash holdings when facing positive or negative cash flow environment. Specifically, this paper does not adequately capture all of the subtle features of cash holdings. Thus, it is necessary to expand sample firms and control variables, and use more elaborate analytic methods in future studies.
cash flows,cash holdings,chaebol firms,financial constraints,agency problems