This paper studies whether the CEO’s social networks affect CEO compensation. Given that the board has advisory and monitoring roles, a CEO with more external networks faces less necessity to share information with the board, and thus, the board’s monitoring weakens. Using network measures between the Korean firms’ executives, I find that CEOs with more external networks receive higher compensations with lower pay-for-performance sensitivities on average, compared to ones with less external networks. The results are robust to a battery of tests and an exogenous shock on the CEO’s external network by a presidential election. Additionally, I hypothesize that the CEO’s internal networks with the board have a trade-off effect: CEO-board connection may reduce information asymmetry between them; however, a connected board may not intensively monitor the CEO. Empirically, I find evidence supporting the latter, that the CEO-board connection enforces the effect of the CEO’s external networks on CEO compensation and pay-for-performance sensitivity.