We provide empirical evidence on how cross-border acquisitions from the perspective of an foreigner acquirer differ from domestic transactions, based on stock and operating performance measures. We analyze the shareholder wealth effects of 663 domestic and international acquisitions announced by Chinese corporations between 1993 and 2006. We find some difference between national and cross-border mergers. We find that foreign acquirers experience significantly higher stock and operating performance than for domestic transactions. Higher target gains for cross-border transactions are consistent with the acquirer's ability to correctly value or capture synergies in cross-border takeovers. We also analyze the role of corporate governance in cross- border acquisitions. Consistent with our hypothesis, we find that for cross-border acquisitions, the abnormal returns to the target firm stockholders are increasing in the ownership of the state and entrepreneur. However, we find that takeover premiums are decreasing in the domestic acquirer’s with the increasing of the state owned shares. This result suggests that foreign acquirers have to compensate target firm shareholders for exposing them to worse corporate governance regimes. These results suggest that corporate governance practices have valuation effects. We also examine the sources of wealth gains in Chinese targets of foreign acquirers. We find that exchange and taxes are important in justifying the target premium in foreign takeovers than in domestic takeovers. Taken together, our results suggest that the realization of synergy is the main motive behind foreign takeovers. A probit analysis suggests that takeovers of foreign firms less likely to make deals in which shareholders have positive change in ROE. How ever, interestingly, the dummy for B Shares or H shares is positively related with domestic takeover premium, indicate that the financial transparency and adequate information disclosure are crucial in transition economies.
Ahn, Ok hwa
Yang, Yuchuan
We provide empirical evidence on how cross-border acquisitions from the perspective of an foreigner acquirer differ from domestic transactions, based on stock and operating performance measures. We analyze the shareholder wealth effects of 663 domestic and international acquisitions announced by Chinese corporations between 1993 and 2006. We find some difference between national and cross-border mergers. We find that foreign acquirers experience significantly higher stock and operating performance than for domestic transactions. Higher target gains for cross-border transactions are consistent with the acquirer's ability to correctly value or capture synergies in cross-border takeovers. We also analyze the role of corporate governance in cross- border acquisitions. Consistent with our hypothesis, we find that for cross-border acquisitions, the abnormal returns to the target firm stockholders are increasing in the ownership of the state and entrepreneur. However, we find that takeover premiums are decreasing in the domestic acquirer’s with the increasing of the state owned shares. This result suggests that foreign acquirers have to compensate target firm shareholders for exposing them to worse corporate governance regimes. These results suggest that corporate governance practices have valuation effects. We also examine the sources of wealth gains in Chinese targets of foreign acquirers. We find that exchange and taxes are important in justifying the target premium in foreign takeovers than in domestic takeovers. Taken together, our results suggest that the realization of synergy is the main motive behind foreign takeovers. A probit analysis suggests that takeovers of foreign firms less likely to make deals in which shareholders have positive change in ROE. How ever, interestingly, the dummy for B Shares or H shares is positively related with domestic takeover premium, indicate that the financial transparency and adequate information disclosure are crucial in transition economies.
