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Investor Protection and the Mode of Acquisition : An Implication for the Formation of Pyramids

  • Woojin Kim Assistant Professor of Finance at Korea University Business School, Seoul, South Korea.
This paper investigates whether the level of investor protection affects the choice between a full scale merger and a purchase of a controlling stake in an acquisition, and examines the consequences of these decisions on target shareholders¡¯ welfare. Using a sample of 10,402 acquisitions from 38 countries between 1990 and 2003, I find that targets from countries with poor investor protection are more likely to be acquired through a ¡®control stake acquisition¡¯ than a ¡®merger¡¯ thereby creating inter-corporate control chains. The returns to target minority shareholders in low protection countries are significantly positive in both ¡®control stake acquisitions¡¯ and ¡®mergers¡¯, but they are substantially lower than those found in countries with high investor protection.

  • Woojin Kim
This paper investigates whether the level of investor protection affects the choice between a full scale merger and a purchase of a controlling stake in an acquisition, and examines the consequences of these decisions on target shareholders¡¯ welfare. Using a sample of 10,402 acquisitions from 38 countries between 1990 and 2003, I find that targets from countries with poor investor protection are more likely to be acquired through a ¡®control stake acquisition¡¯ than a ¡®merger¡¯ thereby creating inter-corporate control chains. The returns to target minority shareholders in low protection countries are significantly positive in both ¡®control stake acquisitions¡¯ and ¡®mergers¡¯, but they are substantially lower than those found in countries with high investor protection.