재무연구 제 권 호 (2009년 8월)
Asian Review of Financial Research, Vol., No..
pp.231~246
pp.231~246
Hierarchical Contract and Collusion
Hyeng Keun Koo School of Business Administration, Ajou University, Suwon, 443-749, Korea
Gyoocheol Shim Financial Engineering, The Graduate School of Ajou University, Suwon, 443-749, Korea
Jaeyoung Sung School of Business Administration, Ajou University, Suwon, 443-749, Korea
We study a moral-hazard-based multi-agent contracting model where the agents have the chance of collusion. We argue that an hierarchical contract, where investors contract the top manager and the top manager contracts all middle managers, is a collusion proof contract, and show that it is more e±cient than the direct contract in the presence of collusion chance.
Hyeng Keun Koo
Gyoocheol Shim
Jaeyoung Sung
We study a moral-hazard-based multi-agent contracting model where the agents have the chance of collusion. We argue that an hierarchical contract, where investors contract the top manager and the top manager contracts all middle managers, is a collusion proof contract, and show that it is more e±cient than the direct contract in the presence of collusion chance.
