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Effects of Competition and Ownership Structure on Chinese and Korean Banks¡¯ Profitability

  • Sunghwan Kim School of Business Administration, Kyungpook National University
  • Xuguang Liu Graduate student, School of Business Administration, Kyungpook National University
  • Seongmin Jeon Graduate student, School of Business Administration, Kyungpook National University
Using a combined panel data of Chinese and Korean banks from 1991 to 2007, we study the effects of market structure and ownership structure of banks on their returns on assets. We focus, especially, on the effects of shares of government, the largest shareholder, and foreign shareholders of banks in the two countries. While the banking sector in Korea is more competitive and deregulated, the Chinese market is considered still in transition to a market-based system. We test such hypotheses that the banking sector in a market economy like Korea is more effective than that in the transitional economy like China in achieving higher profitability for their stakeholders, that the higher the governmental shares in banks such as most banks in China and the governmental banks in Korea, the less effective the banking sector is, and thus that banks controlled more by the government would be less profitable. Interestingly, we find that while banks owned by the government might be less effective in operation, banks with larger governmental shares in China perform better in terms of profitability and many other aspects, compared with Korean commercial banks, that banks with larger governmental and foreign ownership in Korea are less profitable but more effective, and that banks achieved higher profitability even with much higher wages per employee.

  • Sunghwan Kim
  • Xuguang Liu
  • Seongmin Jeon
Using a combined panel data of Chinese and Korean banks from 1991 to 2007, we study the effects of market structure and ownership structure of banks on their returns on assets. We focus, especially, on the effects of shares of government, the largest shareholder, and foreign shareholders of banks in the two countries. While the banking sector in Korea is more competitive and deregulated, the Chinese market is considered still in transition to a market-based system. We test such hypotheses that the banking sector in a market economy like Korea is more effective than that in the transitional economy like China in achieving higher profitability for their stakeholders, that the higher the governmental shares in banks such as most banks in China and the governmental banks in Korea, the less effective the banking sector is, and thus that banks controlled more by the government would be less profitable. Interestingly, we find that while banks owned by the government might be less effective in operation, banks with larger governmental shares in China perform better in terms of profitability and many other aspects, compared with Korean commercial banks, that banks with larger governmental and foreign ownership in Korea are less profitable but more effective, and that banks achieved higher profitability even with much higher wages per employee.
Banking,Market Structure,Ownership,Panel,Profitability,Governance,China,Korea