재무연구 제 권 호 (2010년 5월)
Asian Review of Financial Research, Vol., No..
pp.738~766
pp.738~766
Resolving the Underinvestment and Asymmetric Information Problems with Target Debt Ratios
Unyong Pyo Unyong Pyo, Faculty of Business, Brock University, St. Catharines, Ontario, L2S3A1, Canada.
Yong-Jae Shin Department of Business Administration, Soong-Eui Women’s College, Seoul
Howard E. Thompson Professor Emeritus, School of Business, University of Wisconsin-Madison, 975 University Avenue, Madison, Wisconsin
We show how target debt ratios in book value terms applied to new investment can be used to improve alignment of investment incentives toward value maximization in firms with risky debt outstanding and asymmetric information. While wealth transfer from both agency conflicts can reduce the value of existing equity, new debt offsets the value loss to old shareholders. Since financing a part of investments with new debt set by book debt ratios offsets wealth transfer effects, firms will not pass up valuable investment opportunities and will make optimal investment decisions. Numerical examples show that both agency conflicts can be eliminated with new debt set by a target book debt ratio.
Unyong Pyo
Yong-Jae Shin
Howard E. Thompson
We show how target debt ratios in book value terms applied to new investment can be used to improve alignment of investment incentives toward value maximization in firms with risky debt outstanding and asymmetric information. While wealth transfer from both agency conflicts can reduce the value of existing equity, new debt offsets the value loss to old shareholders. Since financing a part of investments with new debt set by book debt ratios offsets wealth transfer effects, firms will not pass up valuable investment opportunities and will make optimal investment decisions. Numerical examples show that both agency conflicts can be eliminated with new debt set by a target book debt ratio.
target debt ratios,agency costs,underinvestment,asymmetric information
