Under a Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) scheme, it is common for a government to select a concessionaire via a Beauty Contest and then sign a concession contract following a two-sided negotiation. The two-sided negotiation following the Beauty Contest influences the bidding strategies of the bidders in the Beauty Contest. This investigation tries to link auctions and bargaining to price royalty in a BOT scheme under information asymmetry. For simplicity, this study assumes that royalty is the only relevant evaluation criterion in the Beauty Contest and the sole issue of negotiation, thus reducing the Beauty Contest to a transformed first-price sealed-bid auction and the subsequent negotiation to bargaining regarding a single issue. Royalty can then be priced using the traditional auction theory combined with a classical bargaining model. Furthermore, subsidy is also considered as a negative payment of a concessionaire, thus the model can price not only royalty for a profitable project but also subsidy for an unprofitable project. Some common collusive tricks are then incorporated into the bidding and bargaining game to discuss how those manipulate the royalty or subsidy. The discussion shows that when the cartel underestimates the net operating cash flows and overestimates the construction costs, it effectively decreases the royalty received by the government or increases the loss subsidy offered by the government. Finally, this study use a case study to demonstrate how the model works in the real world and how the private sector profits from collusion in a BOT tender.