재무연구 제 권 호 (2012년 8월)
Asian Review of Financial Research, Vol., No..
pp.189~231
pp.189~231
Does Corporate Social Responsibility Reduce Information Asymmetry?
Jinhua Cui Ph.d. candidate of Finance in the School of Business, Korea University
Hoje Jo Professor and Chair of Finance, Leavey School of Business, Santa Clara University
Haejung Na Ph.d. student of Finance in the School of Business, Korea University, Korea.
In this article, we examine the empirical association between corporate social responsibility (CSR) and information asymmetry by investigating their causal, simultaneous, and endogenous effects. Employing a large and extensive U.S. sample during 1991-2010, we find an inverse association between CSR engagement and the level of information asymmetry after controlling for various firm characteristics. Based on the simultaneous equation approach, we further find that CSR activities reduce information asymmetry more than information asymmetry decreases CSR activities. Furthermore, after controlling for endogeneity based on dynamic panel generalized method of moment (GMM), we still find an inverse relation between CSR engagement and information asymmetry. We interpret these results to support the stakeholder-theory based information-asymmetry-reduction explanation that considers CSR engagement as a vehicle to reduce asymmetric information between managers and noninvesting stakeholders, but not the agency-theory based over-investment hypothesis that views CSR as a waste of valuable resources at the cost of shareholders and considers firm’s CSR engagement making information environment more opaque.
Jinhua Cui
Hoje Jo
Haejung Na
In this article, we examine the empirical association between corporate social responsibility (CSR) and information asymmetry by investigating their causal, simultaneous, and endogenous effects. Employing a large and extensive U.S. sample during 1991-2010, we find an inverse association between CSR engagement and the level of information asymmetry after controlling for various firm characteristics. Based on the simultaneous equation approach, we further find that CSR activities reduce information asymmetry more than information asymmetry decreases CSR activities. Furthermore, after controlling for endogeneity based on dynamic panel generalized method of moment (GMM), we still find an inverse relation between CSR engagement and information asymmetry. We interpret these results to support the stakeholder-theory based information-asymmetry-reduction explanation that considers CSR engagement as a vehicle to reduce asymmetric information between managers and noninvesting stakeholders, but not the agency-theory based over-investment hypothesis that views CSR as a waste of valuable resources at the cost of shareholders and considers firm’s CSR engagement making information environment more opaque.
Corporate social responsibility. Information asymmetry. Stakeholder theory. Over-investment
