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IPO Underwriting and Subsequent Lending

  • Hsuan-Chi Chen Anderson School of Management University of New Mexico Albuquerque, NM 87131, USA
  • Li-Ping Chen Department of Finance Yuan Ze University 320 Jhongli, Taiwan
  • Keng-Yu Ho Department of Finance National Taiwan University 106 Taipei, Taiwan
  • Pei-Shih Weng Department of Finance National Central University 320 Jhongli, Taiwan
This study investigates the relation between IPO underwriting and subsequent lending. We find that when a bank underwrites a firm¡¯s IPO, the bank is more likely to provide the issuer with future loans at a lower cost, compared to banks without an IPO underwriting relationship. The evidence also suggests that the underwriting banks share information surplus with the IPO firms in the post-IPO loans, supporting the cost-saving hypothesis. Finally, when borrowing firms are more satisfied with the IPO outcomes, they are more likely to retain their underwriting banks as subsequent lenders. We find no evidence that underwriting banks would exploit such satisfaction by charging higher interest rates in the post-IPO loans.

  • Hsuan-Chi Chen
  • Li-Ping Chen
  • Keng-Yu Ho
  • Pei-Shih Weng
This study investigates the relation between IPO underwriting and subsequent lending. We find that when a bank underwrites a firm¡¯s IPO, the bank is more likely to provide the issuer with future loans at a lower cost, compared to banks without an IPO underwriting relationship. The evidence also suggests that the underwriting banks share information surplus with the IPO firms in the post-IPO loans, supporting the cost-saving hypothesis. Finally, when borrowing firms are more satisfied with the IPO outcomes, they are more likely to retain their underwriting banks as subsequent lenders. We find no evidence that underwriting banks would exploit such satisfaction by charging higher interest rates in the post-IPO loans.
Initial public offering,Bank loan,Underwriting