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Why do fund managers increase risk?

  • Yeonjeong Ha Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology
  • Kwangsoo Ko Pusan National University
Based on the convex relationship between fund performance and cash flows, many studies show that loser funds increase their risk to improve performance. However, in a recent paper, Huang, Sialm, and Zhang (2011) show the performance is particularly severe for funds that increase their risk. This paper examines the relationship between risk-increase and cash flows. Using fund net flows, inflows, and outflows, this study explains the reason why fund managers increase risk. Risk-increase affect inflows and outflows but not net flows because the net effects of inflows and outflows are mixed and blurred. Therefore, a fund¡¯s assets under management do not change as risk increases. When performance is better (the best), risk-increase has a positive effect on inflows, which is related to idiosyncratic risk. When performance is worse (the worst), riskincrease has a negative effect on outflows, which is related to systematic risk. The results suggest that risk-increase may lead to an agency problem between fund managers and investors.

  • Yeonjeong Ha
  • Kwangsoo Ko
Based on the convex relationship between fund performance and cash flows, many studies show that loser funds increase their risk to improve performance. However, in a recent paper, Huang, Sialm, and Zhang (2011) show the performance is particularly severe for funds that increase their risk. This paper examines the relationship between risk-increase and cash flows. Using fund net flows, inflows, and outflows, this study explains the reason why fund managers increase risk. Risk-increase affect inflows and outflows but not net flows because the net effects of inflows and outflows are mixed and blurred. Therefore, a fund¡¯s assets under management do not change as risk increases. When performance is better (the best), risk-increase has a positive effect on inflows, which is related to idiosyncratic risk. When performance is worse (the worst), riskincrease has a negative effect on outflows, which is related to systematic risk. The results suggest that risk-increase may lead to an agency problem between fund managers and investors.
Fund risk-increase,Fund inflows,Fund outflows,Agency problems