With the increasing demand and supply for outsourced chief investment officers (OCIOs) in Korea, they are frequently discussed in the literature. Unlike OCIOs in other countries, those in Korea lack institutional efficiency; hence, some problems are being pointed out, such as the provision of low returns by them. Previous discussions define these as an agency problem related to OCIOs. They suggest that the fee system and short contract period cause these low returns and argue that a performance fee should be paid, or contract terms should be extended. However, they overlook OCIOs’ risk management. Even if an OCIO improves revenue, agency problems may arise if risk is not managed adequately. Accordingly, unlike previous research, this study investigates the issue of OCIOs’ risk management performance. This study provides proof for the argument that improving funds’ expertise is essential. With increased instability and complexity in the financial market, funds are very likely to have limited access to information. Thus, funds use OCIOs’ services because of the high cost of collecting information and evaluate the performance of the portfolio created by the OCIO according to their own expertise. In these circumstances, we review the impact of the fund's expertise on the agency problem related to OCIOs. We also consider whether extending the contract period to improve an OCIO's poor returns could cause agency problems related to OCIOs’ risk management. In this study, we construct a model for analyzing the agency problem related to OCIOs, focusing on the contract period and the fund’s expertise. As the contract period increases and the fund loses its expertise, the OCIO does not manage risk faithfully. However, it is necessary to extend the contract term to improve profitability. Thus, to prevent agency problems from occurring in the process of improving an OCIO’s returns, the contract period should be economics, solutions to agency problems are classified as either proper incentive design or the direct monitoring of agents. We argue that the agency problem related to low returns in the OCIO structure can be solved through incentive design, whereas the problem related to risk management can be solved through monitoring. Increasing the contract term serves as an incentive for OCIOs to improve their returns, and evaluating funds based on an OCIO's risk management performance induces the OCIO to manage risk. Thus, forging long-term partnerships between OCIOs and funds is essential for resolving agency issues.