LOG IN⠴ݱâ

  • ȸ¿ø´ÔÀÇ ¾ÆÀ̵ð¿Í Æнº¿öµå¸¦ ÀÔ·ÂÇØ ÁÖ¼¼¿ä.
  • ȸ¿øÀÌ ¾Æ´Ï½Ã¸é ¾Æ·¡ [ȸ¿ø°¡ÀÔ]À» ´­·¯ ȸ¿ø°¡ÀÔÀ» ÇØÁֽñ⠹ٶø´Ï´Ù.

¾ÆÀ̵ð ÀúÀå

   

¾ÆÀ̵ð Áߺ¹°Ë»ç⠴ݱâ

HONGGIDONG ˼
»ç¿ë °¡´ÉÇÑ È¸¿ø ¾ÆÀ̵ð ÀÔ´Ï´Ù.

E-mail Áߺ¹È®ÀÎ⠴ݱâ

honggildong@naver.com ˼
»ç¿ë °¡´ÉÇÑ E-mail ÁÖ¼Ò ÀÔ´Ï´Ù.

¿ìÆí¹øÈ£ °Ë»ö⠴ݱâ

°Ë»ö

SEARCH⠴ݱâ

ºñ¹Ð¹øÈ£ ã±â

¾ÆÀ̵ð

¼º¸í

E-mail

ÇмúÀÚ·á °Ë»ö

The Effect of Supervisory Power and Institutions on the Banking Sector Stability in the Post-Crisis Era

  • Wook Sohn KDI School of Public Policy and Management, Sejong, Korea
  • Iegor Vyshnevskyi Woosong University, Daejeon, Korea
This study utilizes new data across countries on bank supervision for the years 1999?2016 to examine the impact of supervisory power and institutional characteristics of supervision on the key stability measures of the banking sector. Our results reveal that the degree of supervisory power and changes in financial supervisory architecture following the global financial crisis tend to enhance the banking sector stability. This study also finds that central banks¡¯ monopolistic involvement in banking supervision appears to strengthen the banking sector stability and the independence of supervisory authority. However, this effect of monopolistic status of central banks in banking supervision countervails the positive effect of the degree of supervisory power and changes in financial supervisory architecture on the soundness of banking sector. These findings shed light on the significance of bank supervisory power and institutional architecture in ensuring the banking sector stability.

  • Wook Sohn
  • Iegor Vyshnevskyi
This study utilizes new data across countries on bank supervision for the years 1999?2016 to examine the impact of supervisory power and institutional characteristics of supervision on the key stability measures of the banking sector. Our results reveal that the degree of supervisory power and changes in financial supervisory architecture following the global financial crisis tend to enhance the banking sector stability. This study also finds that central banks¡¯ monopolistic involvement in banking supervision appears to strengthen the banking sector stability and the independence of supervisory authority. However, this effect of monopolistic status of central banks in banking supervision countervails the positive effect of the degree of supervisory power and changes in financial supervisory architecture on the soundness of banking sector. These findings shed light on the significance of bank supervisory power and institutional architecture in ensuring the banking sector stability.
Banking supervision,Supervisory power,Supervisory architecture,Central bank involvement,Banking crisis